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Insolvency in French soccer: The case of payment failure 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines insolvency (payment failure) in the top three divisions of French soccer. 
Between 1970 and 2014 we observed 79 cases of insolvency arising from participation in the 
top two or three (since 1993) divisions. We find that demand (attendance) shocks can account 
for insolvency to a significant degree. We also find that insolvency can be explained by club 
status and ownership structure, with professional status and the Association structure being 
more likely to lead to insolvency. We also examine the post-insolvency performance of 
soccer clubs and find that the adverse consequences of insolvency are long lasting. 
 
Keywords: insolvency, payment failure, French soccer, attendance, demand shocks, club 
status, ownership.  
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Insolvency in French soccer: The case of payment failure 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Insolvency is a systematic problem in the world of European soccer. In 2012 UEFA, the 
governing body of European soccer reported that 56% of clubs failed to meet at least one of 
the following criteria: no negative net equity, no qualification by the auditors as to whether 
the business was a going concern and no overdues payable (UEFA, 2012; see also 
Szymanski, 2015, chapter 8). This paper examines insolvency (payment failure) at the highest 
levels of French soccer. Between 1970 and 2014 we observed 79 cases of insolvency arising 
from participation in the top two or three (since 1993) divisions, a population of 56 to 78 
clubs.1 
In this paper, our objective is to explain the causes and consequences of insolvencies in 
French soccer. Szymanski (2012) examined data for English soccer clubs in the top four 
divisions (92 clubs) and found a similar incidence of insolvency (67 cases between 1982 and 
2010). His results suggested that insolvency could be explained by negative productivity 
shocks (underperformance of the players) or negative demand shocks (revenues falling below 
expected levels). We also find that demand shocks can account for insolvency to a significant 
degree. Additionally, in the French context insolvency can be explained by club status and 
ownership structure, with professional status and the Association structure being more likely 
to trigger insolvency. We examine the post-insolvency performance of soccer clubs and find 
that the adverse consequences of insolvency are long lasting. 
By extending the research by Szymanski (2012) from English to French soccer, we show that 
insolvency appears to be driven by common forces in European soccer, while noting 
idiosyncratic differences between countries. 
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Our paper is structured as follows. First we review the literature on insolvencies in European 
soccer. Section 3 explains the evolution of French insolvency law and section 4 examines the 
organization of professional soccer in France. Section 5 describes our data on insolvency and 
section 6 reports our regression results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature review of insolvencies in European soccer 
 
There is now a substantial literature on the financial problems of European soccer clubs (see 
e.g. the Special Issue by Journal of Sports Economics introduced by Lago, Simmons and 
Szymanski, 2006) but, as yet, few studies on the topic of insolvencies. Buraimo, Simmons 
and Szymanski (2006) in their discussion of the financial problems of English clubs do not 
deal specifically with insolvencies but refer to them. They note that the usual reasons cited to 
explain why clubs amass high levels of indebtedness, including an inability to sell players as 
assets through the transfer market, a loss of revenues consequent on relegation, an inability to 
align costs and revenues following relegation, an inability to maintain loan payments on 
capital expenditure such as a new stadium, and a failure to realize expected revenues from 
TV broadcasting deals.  
Beech, Horsman and Magraw (2008, 2010) identify five types of insolvencies in English 
soccer: 
1. clubs that have failed to cope with relegation; 
2. clubs that have failed to pay monies due to the government; 
3. clubs that have seen ‘soft’ debt become ‘hard’ debt; 
4. clubs that have lost the ownership of their stadium; 
5. ‘repeat offenders’. 
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As the authors indicate, these types are not mutually exclusive. Szymanski (2012) uses a 
unique database of financial accounts for English soccer clubs between 1973/74 and 2009/10 
to examine the causes of insolvency. Two hypotheses (also not mutually exclusive) are 
considered. The first is “irrational exuberance”, meaning that owners attempt to achieve a 
significant improvement in league position which is not affordable, leading to financial crisis. 
The second is that club finances are subject to negative shocks – either to productivity (on the 
field) or to demand – and that a series of such shocks can lead to insolvency. His empirical 
model provides evidence in support of the negative shocks hypothesis. 
Barajas and Rodríguez (2010) use a logistic regression to explain why some clubs are under 
administration in Spanish soccer. They rely on a sample of 35 clubs in 2008, of which six 
were in the legal insolvency process of administration in that year. Their selected explanatory 
variables are mainly financial ones: financing rate (the ratio of short term debt to current 
assets), indebtedness (Total Debts / Total Assets), the ratio of total revenues to debt, the ratio 
of staff expenses to operating revenues and the ratio short-term to long-term debt. They also 
include divisional dummies. They find no significant impact of their explanatory variables on 
the likelihood that a club has entered the administration process.  
Barajas and Rodríguez (2014) analyze Spanish clubs during the period from 2007 until 2011, 
using Altman’s methodology to classify clubs according to their Z-score values (Altman, 
1968, 2000; Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan, 1977). They note that Spanish soccer is in a 
very poor financial condition with most clubs being at risk of going bankrupt. The authors 
identify a number of steps required to restore financial stability including raising equity from 
the capital markets or club members, revenue enhancement, wage cuts and working to reduce 
current liabilities. 
 
3. Insolvency laws in France 
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Under French law any debtor unable to meet its obligations is liable to enter a “collective 
insolvency proceeding” (in French “procedure collective”; Bayle, 2009). A major landmark 
in the development of this process was the law 67-563 of 13 July 1967 on judicial resolution, 
liquidation of assets, personal bankruptcy and bankruptcies (in French, “le règlement 
judiciaire, la liquidation de biens, la faillite personnelle et les banqueroutes”) which was 
intended to protect debtors from their creditors while preparing a recovery plan (Stankiewicz 
Murphy, 2011).2 Since the law of 1967, all types of private sector legal entities (even 
“associations”) have been subject to collective insolvency proceedings (Bayle, 2009). In line 
with developments in insolvency laws in the US and other European countries, the legal 
treatment of insolvency shifted in favor of debtor companies in 1980s (Stankiewicz Murphy, 
2011). Tetley and Bayle (2009) summarize the sequence of relevant laws from 1984 to 2008, 
including three principal landmarks: 
 1984: The law 84-148 of 1st March 1984 introduced early warning procedures, which 
obliged managers to report signs of financial weakness and draw up a recovery plan. A 
court-supervised procedure to reach a compromise with creditors was also introduced. 
 1985: The law 85-98 of 25 January 1985 favored company reorganization (in French 
“redressement”) over winding-up proceedings. Reorganization became the guiding 
principle, making liquidation proceedings a last resort (Bailly, 2013). This law defined the 
notion of a “payment failure situation” (in French, “cessation de paiements”, sometimes 
called “depôt de bilan” – filing for bankruptcy – in common parlance) as “the inability [of 
the debtor] to meet current liabilities out of disposable assets”, based on a decision of the 
Court of Cassation (appeals court) on 14 February 1978 (Hyest, 2005).  
 2005: The law 2005-845 of 26 July 2005 introduced four types of proceedings: 
conciliation, safeguard proceedings (in French “procédure de sauvegarde”), judicial 
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reorganization, and liquidation. Conciliation involves only limited judicial supervision, 
whereas the three other proceedings are more involved and require the court to nominate 
those required to carry out the work of reorganization or liquidation. 
 
For the purposes of this paper we use the concept of “payment failure situation” (triggering a 
legal response) as synonymous with “insolvency”. Technically speaking, a payment failure 
situation is triggered when current liabilities are greater than disposable assets, while 
insolvency is usually defined as the situation where total liabilities are greater than total 
assets (Tetley, 2009). However, since payment failure situations triggering a legal response 
are akin to insolvency proceedings in other countries, we feel this approach is justified. 
Furthermore, we do not classify safeguard procedures as insolvencies, since they are not 
triggered by a payment failure situation (i.e. a formal test of assets and liabilities), but simply 
the judgment of the company executives that the enterprise is facing a severe financial risk.  
 
We have compiled a list of all relevant cases in French soccer examined in this paper and the 
procedures followed in each case. The list is available on request from the authors.   
 
 
 
4. The organization of professional soccer in France 
 
We have data on insolvencies in French soccer clubs over the period 1970-2014. We now 
document the structural changes in the organization of the competitive hierarchy.   
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Our focus is primarily on professional clubs, by which we mean clubs where all or almost all 
players are paid employees rather than amateurs, which also tends to entail a more 
commercially oriented operation. Prior to 1970 there were professional clubs participating in 
two divisions connected by promotion and relegation, and amateur clubs also operating 
within a promotion/relegation hierarchy, but no automatic promotion/relegation link between 
the amateur and professional divisions. Beginning in 1970 the two systems have been fully 
integrated into a single hierarchy linked by promotion and relegation. Since 1970 there have 
four further restructurings of the divisions, as set out in Table 1. From 1970 to 1993 the 
second division included both professional clubs and amateur clubs. Since 1993, the second 
division comprises only professional clubs while the third division admits both professional 
and amateur clubs, with the latter permitted to pay relatively modest sums to “non-
professional” players on the basis of a ‘federal contract’. 
 
Table 1 
 
The legal definition of soccer clubs, whether amateur or professional, has changed several 
times in recent decades. Until around 1990, most of the clubs were member associations, i.e. 
members paid a subscription to belong to the association, which was run by a committee 
elected by the members, there were no shareholders and any financial surplus had to be 
reinvested in the association. Usually these clubs were supported by local authorities through 
direct subsidies. Some clubs were defined as mixed economy companies (“sociétés 
d’économie mixte”, SEM), meaning that they were controlled jointly by a members’ club and 
a local government authority. A third organizational structure that some clubs adopted was 
the limited liability company with sporting object (“sociétés anonymes à objet sportif”, 
SAOS). Until 1992, the shares of such companies had to be mainly held by the association, 
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but after 1992, a private partner could be the main shareholder (the association minority 
interest was still not allowed to fall below 34%). Dividend payments were not permitted 
under any of these organizational structures.  
In 1999 the Buffet law introduced a new ownership form: professional sport limited company 
(“sociétés anonymes sportives professionnelles”, SASP). This form allows a private partner 
to own the entire capital of a club and receive dividends. By 2013/14, almost all clubs in the 
top two divisions had adopted the SASP structure (LFP/DNCG, 2014). Over the entire period 
the role of local government has decreased and reliance on commercial revenue streams has 
increased.3   
These institutional reforms reflected changes in the commercial structure of soccer as TV 
revenues became more important, as well as a declining willingness of government to fund 
professional sport. Reform was also driven by desire to put clubs on a better financial footing, 
given the persistence of liquidity and insolvency problems. By the late 1980s insolvency was 
perceived to be a threat to the stability of the championship system and this led to the creation 
in 1990 of the “Direction Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion” (DNCG) to regulate the 
financial decisions of soccer clubs (Dermit-Richard, 2004). Prior to the creation of the DNCG 
there existed the “Commission Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion” (CNCG), established in 
1974, which had primarily an advisory role. Between 1990/91 and 1992/93, the DNCG 
regulated clubs in the top two divisions (56 clubs); from 1993/94 to 1995/96, clubs in the top 
three divisions (78 clubs); since 1996/97 it has regulated clubs for the top two divisions (38 to 
42 clubs) while clubs in third division have been regulated by the control committee for 
federal (amateur) championships (Dermit-Richard, 2004). 
The powers of the DNCG include prohibiting the recruitment of players, auditing club 
payrolls and, as a last resort, imposing relegation independently of sporting performance 
(administrative relegation). Before the DNCG era, some insolvent clubs were subject to 
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administrative relegation while some others were not (not relegated at all or relegated by one 
division on the usual grounds of sporting merit); since the start of the DNCG era all insolvent 
clubs have been administratively relegated as a punishment.4 Since 1990/91, the sanctions 
have varied: relegation by one division (administrative relegation only), two divisions (also 
administrative relegation only or both administrative and sporting relegation), among others. 
Since 2010/11, all insolvent clubs have been relegated by at least two divisions 
(administrative relegation). 
Gouguet and Primault (2006) argue that the DNCG has allowed French soccer to avoid the 
financial crisis encountered by the other major European leagues (England, Germany, Italy 
and Spain). Andreff (2007), however, claims that the DNCG has not been able to effectively 
control the financial problems of French clubs, mainly because of the lack of transparency 
and disclosure. We consider the effect that the DNCG has had on declared insolvencies 
below. 
 
5. Descriptive statistics 
 
Our dataset consists of all clubs participating in the top two divisions from 1970/71 to 
1992/93 and top three divisions since 1993/94. Over the period 1970-2014, we have 
identified 79 cases of insolvency. Figure 1 shows the incidence of insolvency by year. While 
insolvencies appear to have been most frequent in the 1990s, there are plenty of examples 
throughout the four decades. 
 
In eight cases clubs were liquidated during the season and because of this were officially 
ranked last, a position not necessarily representative of their sporting performance when they 
were insolvent. For these clubs, we chose to use league performance data from the previous 
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season in our analysis.5 Our date also includes seven cases where the club became insolvent 
at a lower level competition in the season immediately following participation in one of the 
top two or three divisions.6 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the 79 cases where clubs were insolvent while participating or as a 
consequence of participation in the top three divisions. As noted by Szymanski (2012), 
insolvency at the highest level of competition is rare. Only seven clubs were insolvent while 
in the 1st division: Rouen (1977/78), Reims (1978/79), Bordeaux, Nice (both 1990/91), 
Toulon (1992/93), Toulouse (2000/01) and Valenciennes (2013/14). In seven cases clubs 
were insolvent after having been relegated from the first division in the previous season.7 
 
Table 2 
 
We now consider two measures of team performance – league position and match attendance 
– for clubs that entered insolvency, looking at the twelve year period prior to insolvency and 
the twelve year period after insolvency. Since we shift our focus from the top two divisions 
up to 1993 to the top three divisions after 1993, we show the mean performance for club 
insolvencies from each period separately. Figures 2 and 3 show league position and 
attendance for clubs that were insolvent during the period 1970-1993, while Figures 4 and 5 
show league position and attendance for clubs that were insolvent during the period 1993-
2014. Inspection of the figures shows that the pattern in each period is in fact broadly similar. 
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Before examining the charts we should explain how we constructed our normalized measure 
of league position. In each division each club achieves a league position based on points and, 
if necessary, goal difference. To account for the different levels in the league hierarchy we 
convert league position in the following way: 
 teams with (normalized) positions 1-20 in the first division are given positions 1 to 20, 
 teams with (normalized) positions 1-20 in the second division are given positions 21 and 
40, 
 teams with (normalized) positions 1-20 in the third division are given positions 41 and 608. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
 
Pre-insolvency performance 
 
Considering season t-12 to t, where season t is the season in which the insolvency event 
occurred, Figures 2 and 4 show a consistent pattern for league position. Average league 
position is improving modestly and consistently (recalling that better league positions are 
those with the lower numbers) until around three seasons prior to insolvency (t-3 or t-2), at 
which point league performance starts to deteriorate. The average improvement is about 10-
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15 league places over ten years, while the decline leading up to insolvency amounts to around 
2-3 places on average over 2-3 years. 
 
Figures 3 and 5 show that in the three years leading up to insolvency the attendance pattern is 
also broadly similar for the two insolvency windows: attendance falls vey sharply, by around 
40%. It is well established that lower league positions are associated with lower attendance 
(see e.g. Szymanski (2015, chapter 4)), but the drop here is much larger than one might 
expect for the modest fall in average position. For the ten years prior to that (when league 
position is trending positively) the attendance picture is slightly different for the two 
windows. For insolvencies prior to 1993/94, average attendance is relatively stable, while for 
insolvencies since 1993/94 attendance is rising, by around 50% over a ten-year period. These 
differences may reflect more general trends in the popularity of professional soccer in France. 
 
 
Post insolvency performance 
 
From Figures 2 and 4 we can see that there is a very sharp drop in league position 
immediately following insolvency, by about 30 places for insolvencies prior to 1993/94 and 
about 40 places for insolvencies since 1993/94. This is due to the automatic and severe 
sporting sanctions applied by the French soccer authorities. For the earlier window average 
league position is roughly stable right up to t+12, while in the later window it recovers by 
around ten places by around t+3 and stabilizes thereafter. Overall, this suggests that average 
clubs struggle to recover from the penalties imposed on the clubs by the soccer authorities, 
even after insolvency has allowed the club to escape liability for some or all of its debts. 
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In the light of this, Figures 3 and 5 might seem surprising, since attendance rises significantly 
in both windows, reaching pre-insolvency levels by t+10, and far exceeding them by t+4. 
However, some caution must be used in interpreting the data, especially for the second 
window where we have relatively few data points. As mentioned above, we suspect that these 
changes may mainly reflect changes in the popularity of French soccer in general over time. 
 
In comparison to Szymanski (2012) the pre-insolvency patterns are rather similar, although 
the improvement in league position in the English case is slightly more modest (around 8 
places on average from t-15 to t-6) and the fall leading up to insolvency starts earlier (from t-
5) and is sharper (about 18 places). He also identifies a large fall in revenues in the years 
leading up to insolvency, which parallels the sharp fall in attendance observed in the French 
case. However, there is a very significant difference in post-insolvency performance, since 
English clubs on average recovered to reach the same position they occupied in t-5 by t+5. 
Insolvency in English soccer appears to be a temporary setback, in France it is a permanent 
one. This may well reflect the might lighter sporting penalties applied in England. While 
enforced relegation, often by more than one division, has long been the norm in France, there 
were no sporting penalties in England until 2005. Currently insolvent clubs face a points 
penalty (usually nine points) which makes relegation more likely, but not inevitable, and 
never by more than one division. 
 
To explore this further, in Table 3 we compare the post insolvency performance of clubs with 
that of clubs that are relegated purely on sporting merit.9 This table shows that insolvent clubs 
are far less likely to recover to their pre-insolvency league position, either within five or ten 
years of relegation, than clubs that were relegated on sporting merit. Table 3 shows that while 
52.5% of clubs relegated on sporting merit recover to reach the division they were relegated 
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from within 5 years, and 66% do so within 10 years, only 25.5% and 36% respectively of 
insolvent clubs achieve the same feat. The percentage differences are even larger for clubs 
relegated from the second and third levels. The only exception is the relatively small number 
of cases from the top division, which are slightly more likely to get back to the top division 
within 5 years than clubs relegated on sporting merit are on average. 
 
Table 3 
 
 
Since clubs may be punished for insolvency by relegation by more than one division, Table 4 
reports the fraction recovering to the pre-punishment levels within 5 and 10 years. Not 
surprisingly, relegation by more than one division makes recovery far less likely. 
 
Table 4 
 
6. Regression analysis 
 
The descriptive statistics suggest that falling demand (declining attendance) is associated 
with insolvencies. We now develop a regression model to test whether shocks to demand can 
be identified as a cause of insolvency. Our regression strategy is to estimate a relationship 
between league performance and attendance, as a proxy for demand, and then to use the 
residuals from this regression as explanatory variables in a probit regression for insolvency. 
Although the rise of broadcasting has made attendance less important as a source of revenue 
for French soccer clubs (see e.g. Andreff & Staudohar, 2000), it remains a good proxy for 
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overall demand since broadcasters and sponsors will pay more for rights to popular clubs (see 
e.g. Buraimo, Paramio & Campos, 2010).  
 
Following Leach (2006) we adopt an error correction framework; our 
performance/attendance regression model is defined as:  
 
Δrelattit = γ0 + γ1lnrelattit-1 + γ2Δlnrelattit-1 + γ3lnpit-1 + γ4Δlnpit + γ5lnrelpopit + main club 
dummy + promotion/relegation dummies + division/tier dummies + performance/tier 
interaction dummies + ηit           (1) 
 
Where relatt is the average attendance of the club divided by the sum of all clubs’ average 
attendances in that season, lnp is league rank, relpop is the population of the club urban area 
(referring to the French concept of “unité urbaine”) divided by the sum of all urban areas with 
at least one club, and “main club” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the club is the main club 
in its urban area and 0 otherwise. Since we are using (1) to obtain best linear unbiased 
predictors of attendance (revenue), rather than estimates of the structural parameters, we do 
not need to assume the exogeneity of the right hand side variables. 
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions for attendance. The results are intuitive: higher 
attendance is associated with clubs with higher league positions, participating in higher 
league divisions and playing in urban areas with larger populations. Promoted clubs enjoy a 
significant boost to attendance while relegated teams lose support. The signs and significance 
levels of the coefficients are comparable to those found by Szymanski (2012) for English 
soccer. 
 
Table 5 
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The main focus of interest here is the residuals from (1). We chose to use the residuals from 
the fixed effects specification in Table 5 to estimate the probability of insolvency (Table 6). 
In addition we included variables indicating (i) the interaction between club status 
(Professional or Amateur) and ownership form (Association or Company), (ii) divisional 
status (first, second or third) (iii) the presence of the DNCG or amateur control regulatory 
regimes. 
 
Table 6 
 
Columns 1-6 of Table 6 differ according to the number of residuals used. Thus column 1 uses 
residuals in t, column 2 adds residuals in t-1, and so on until t-5. This captures the idea that 
insolvency can be triggered by a sequence of negative shocks. The residuals are of the right 
sign (negative) and significant for each regression from t to t:t-3. Note that although the 
coefficient is larger when only the more recent shocks are included, a longer history also 
means a greater cumulative effect. Overall we believe these results strongly support the 
findings of Szymanski (2012) that negative demand shocks contribute significantly to the 
probability of an insolvency event.  
 
We also find that the coefficients for Professional * Association and Professional * Company 
have a positive sign and are significant in each regression, although they are much higher for 
Professional * Association than Professional * Company. This suggests that the Professional 
status is more likely to lead to insolvency than the Amateur status, but that the transformation 
to a more commercial structure (away from the traditional association structure) has reduced 
the probability of insolvency for Professional clubs. This seems plausible: amateur clubs are 
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less likely to get into financial problems simply because they do not pay players and the wage 
bill is main financial risk of most clubs. Association status typically entails less concentrated 
ownership, and therefore less certain financial backing (given shared responsibility, there is a 
significant risk of free-riding).  
 
 
Not surprisingly, clubs in lower divisions are more likely to enter insolvency. However, we 
find no evidence that the regulatory organizations, either the DNCG or the Amateur club 
control, have had any impact on reducing insolvency, consistent with the views of Andreff 
(2007). We even find a significant positive effect of DNCG (at the 10% level only) in our 
first regression, suggesting that the DNCG may have generated even more insolvencies10. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, our objective was to examine the causes of insolvency in French soccer over the 
period 1970-2014. Our dataset included all professional soccer clubs operating during this 
period.  
 
We estimate the impact of demand shocks, calculated by estimating the difference between 
actual and expected attendance levels, based on team performance, club fixed effects and 
other relevant variables. Our results show that negative demand shocks significantly increase 
the likelihood of insolvency. The cumulative effect of these shocks can extend up to three 
seasons prior to the insolvency event. These findings are very similar to those of Szymanski 
(2012), whose data covered a similar period and who used a similar methodology for the case 
English professional soccer. 
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Indeed, although the regulatory regimes are quite different, insolvency seems to present itself 
in a similar way in both soccer league systems. Over the period 1970-2014, 79 insolvencies 
occurred in French professional soccer, more than in English professional soccer (Szymanski, 
2012). Because there are fewer professional clubs in France, there are fewer club-years in our 
data – 2636 versus 3404 in the English professional soccer dataset. The frequency of 
insolvencies per club-year appears broadly similar: 3% in France compared to 2% in 
England. 
 
We also find an increased probability of insolvency connected to the organizational structure 
of the club; professional clubs (i.e. those who employ professional rather than amateur 
players) and clubs organized as member associations are more likely to become insolvent.   
 
While our results suggest that insolvency may be triggered by broadly similar causes in 
England and France, to some extent beyond the control of the clubs themselves, the 
regulatory responses differ significantly. In France the soccer authorities have long imposed a 
relegation penalty on insolvent clubs, often by more than one division, while in England 
sporting sanctions have only been applied since 2005, remain lighter, and may not even force 
a club to be relegated.   
 
Our results have important policy implications. First, while the regulatory regimes in English 
and French soccer differ radically, the results, as least with respect to the incidence of 
insolvency, appear broadly similar, suggesting there are deeper systemic issues. Szymanski 
(2012, 2015) suggest that the systemic problem may be the promotion and relegation system, 
which injects a good deal of uncertainty into the competitive process. 
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Second, the idea of giving fans more power through ownership is a popular one at the 
moment, while our results suggest that this might increase financial instability for 
professional clubs. Third, while insolvency is often attributed to overambitious expansion by 
the club management, it may be that simple bad luck plays a more important role. 
Considering post insolvency events, we find that clubs frequently struggle to achieve the 
same level of competition again, mainly because of the difference of level between t and t+1. 
This raises the question of whether penalties imposed by the French soccer authorities are 
justified or not. Given that the penalties can prevent a club from recovering to its previous 
level this is an important concern. 
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Footnotes 
                                                          
1 Soccer clubs play in leagues that are connected through the system of promotion and relegation which enables 
clubs to move to a higher level based on sporting merit, replacing those that perform poorly (this is in sharp 
contrast to the American model in which teams do not move between different levels of competition). Given this 
pyramid structure, there is a large number of clubs operating below this level and many of these have also 
become insolvent, but these cases are harder to document. 
2 This procedure was limited to entities that could prove (a) the financial situation was not irreparable (b) there 
would be a full and speedy recovery prospects and (c) liquidation would be damaging to either the regional or 
the national economy. In practice the law did little to preserve insolvent businesses (Stankiewicz Murphy, 
2011). 
3 Until the end of the 1980s clubs obtained about 50% of the revenues from gate receipts, 30% form sponsorship 
and 20% from local government subsidies. TV revenues were negligible. Since then the contribution of TV 
rights has risen to around 50% of the total, gate revenues has fallen to as little as 10%, and public subsidies have 
almost disappeared (see Andreff (2012) and LFP/DNCG (2012, 2014)). 
4 The exception is Marseille, which won the second division championship in 1994/95 and was punished by not 
being promoted to the first division instead. 
5 For example, AC Ajaccio played only three games during the season 1974/75, when it was bankrupt. In our 
analysis, we consider this insolvency as having occurred at the end of 1973/74. The exception is Saint-Brieuc in 
1996/97 as this is the only club that was liquidated in-season for which we could find both their sporting 
performance and their attendance when they were liquidated. This is also the only club that got promoted the 
previous season. 
6 (i) Bourges and Reims became insolvent respectively in 1977/78 and 1991/92 while in the 3rd division, having 
been relegated from the 2nd division (in the case of Reims, for financial difficulties), (ii) Tours and Gap became 
insolvent in 1993/94 and 2011/12 respectively, while in the 4th division, having been relegated from 3rd division 
for financial difficulties, (iii) Uzès became insolvent in 2014/15 while in the 5th division, having been relegated 
from the 3rd division both for sporting and financial reasons, (iv) Le Mans became insolvent in 2013/14 while in 
the 6th division, having been relegated from 2nd division both for sporting and financial reasons, (v) Cassis-
Carnoux became insolvent in 2010/11 while in the 7th division and after having been relegated from 3rd division 
both for sporting and financial reasons. We did not include clubs that became insolvent in the season 
immediately following participation in one of the top two or three divisions if we did not find evidence that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
insolvency occurred ‘during’ rather than ‘at the end of’ the season. The reason is that insolvency during the 
season is more likely to be the consequence of problems in the previous season, while insolvency at the end of 
the season is more likely to be caused by problems in the current season. 
7 Rennes in 1977/78, Troyes in 1978/79, Marseille in 1980/81 and 1994/95 (relegated for administrative reasons 
in 1993/94), Angers in 1981/82, Valenciennes in 1982/83 and Brest in 1991/92 (relegated for financial 
difficulties in 1990/91). Ajaccio (relegated from the first division in 1972/73) was bankrupt in 1974/75 after 
having played only three games. 
8 The appendix describes the normalization in more detail. 
9 Only 55 cases of insolvencies are included here. Of the remaining insolvency cases 14 clubs were not relegated 
(Mulhouse being even promoted in 1988/89), one disappeared (Nevers in 1993/94) and nine clubs have had not 
sufficient time to regain their previous level (i.e. these clubs were relegated by more divisions than the number 
of seasons since played). When extending to 10 years, five other cases are excluded as four can still regain their 
previous level within 10 years at the time of writing this paper while Saint-Seurin merged with Libourne six 
years after its insolvency. 
10 Eight insolvencies occurred or were considered as having occurred in 1990/91 (first season with DNCG) in 
our regression analysis but the DNCG could not really prevent them as it was implemented only in September 
1990 so too late so as to operate an a priori monitoring (before the beginning of the season) on clubs (on their 
transfers and salaries). When we allocate 0 instead of 1 for DNCG in 1990/91, it becomes insignificant with a 
negative sign and is close to have a significant impact at the 10% level for our regressions with attendance 
residuals t:t-4 and t:t-5 with p-values equal to 0.101 and 0.102, respectively (while Amateur control has a 
negative and significant impact at the 10% level with attendance residuals t:t-3 and t:t-5, and at the 5% level for 
attendance residuals t:t-4). Our contrasted results for DNCG regarding whether we consider 1990/91 as a season 
with or without DNCG could translate its paradoxical effect: positive by imposing financial planning to clubs 
and monitoring their solvency for the next season (from 1991/92); negative by strongly sanctioning clubs with 
relegation, meaning fewer revenues so fewer opportunities to face their expenditure (in particular in 1990/91 
when the new DNCG had to demonstrate its power of sanction; Dermit-Richard, 2004). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Number of clubs (and groups) in the French soccer divisions from the first to the best regional over the 
period 1969-2014 
 1969/70 1970/72 1972/78 1978/93 1993/97 1997/2014 
1st division 
(D1) 
18 20 20 20 20 
18 until 2001/02 
then 20 
2nd division 
(D2) 
16 48 (3*16) 36 (2*18) 36 (2*18) 22 
22 in 1997/98 then 
20 
3rd division 
(D3) 
72 (6*12) 
75 in 
1970/71, 81 
in 1971/72 
(6 groups) 
96 (6*16) 96 (6*16) 36 (2*18) 20, 18 in 2013/14 
4th division 
(D4) 
240 
(20*12) 
240 (20*12) 
240 until 
1973/74 then 
260 (20 
groups) 
112 (8*14) 72 (4*18) 
72 (4*18), 62 in 
2013/14 (2*15 and 
2*16) 
5th division 
(D5) 
- - - 
260 until 
1979/80 (20 
groups), 273 
in 1980/81 
(21 groups) 
then 286 (22 
groups) 
112 (8*14) 
128 (8*16), 112 
from 2012/13 
(8*14) 
6th division 
(D6) 
- - - - 286 (22*13) 308 (22*14) 
Total 
number of 
clubs 
346 
383 in 
1970/71, 389 
in 1971/72 
392 until 
1973/74 
then 412 
524 until 
1979/80, 537 
in 1981/82 
then 550 
548 
568 in 1997/98, 
566 until 2001/02, 
568 again until 
2011/12, 552 in 
2012/13, 540 in 
2013/14 
 
Table 2 Number of insolvencies per period and level in French soccer clubs over the period 1970-2014 
 1st division 2nd division 
3rd division 
(1993-2014) 
Total 
Entire period 7 44 28 79 
1970-1981 2 8 - 10 
1981-1992 2 27 - 29 
1992-2003 2 6 16 24 
2003-2014 1 3 12 16 
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Table 3 Consequences of relegation for cases of sporting relegation only and cases of insolvency 
  
5 years 10 years 
  
Sporting 
relegations only 
Insolvencies 
Sporting 
relegations only 
Insolvencies 
All divisions 
Number of cases 343 55 321 50 
Regaining 
previous level 
180 14 212 18 
% 52.5% 25.5% 66.0% 36% 
1st division 
Number of cases 110 6 103 6 
Regaining 
previous level 
73 4 82 4 
% 66.4% 66.7% 79.6% 66.7% 
2nd division 
Number of cases 163 30 160 28 
Regaining 
previous level 
78 5 93 7 
% 47.9% 16.7% 58.1% 25% 
3rd division 
Number of cases 70 19 58 16 
Regaining 
previous level 
29 5 37 7 
% 41.4% 26.3% 63.8% 43.8% 
 
Table 4 Consequences of relegation for cases of insolvency according to the difference of level between t 
(insolvency event) and t+1 
Difference of 
level 
Clubs 
Clubs regaining previous 
level / 5 years 
Clubs regaining previous 
level / 10 years 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
1 23 41.8% 11 47.8% 14 63.6% 
2 11 20% 2 18.2% 3 27.3% 
3 15 27.3% 1 6.7% 1 9.1% 
At least 4 6 10.9% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 55 100% 14 25.5% 18 36% 
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Table 5 Regressions explaining attendance variation in season t 
 
Attendance 
only 
Attendance and 
position 
Attendance and 
position and 
position/tier 
interaction 
Fixed 
effects 
ln(Attendance/∑Attendances) (t-1) 
-0.153*** 
(0.0175) 
-0.196*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.195*** 
(0.0159) 
-0.404*** 
(0.0258) 
∆ ln(Attendance/∑Attendances) (t-1) 
-0.134*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.102*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.102*** 
(0.0191) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0181) 
ln (Population/∑Populations) (t) 
0.0480*** 
(0.00663) 
0.0387*** 
(0.00582) 
0.0399*** 
(0.00563) 
0.0192 
(0.0634) 
Main club 
0.268*** 
(0.0418) 
0.265*** 
(0.0362) 
0.274*** 
(0.0352) 
0.221* 
(0.132) 
Promotion (t-1) 
0.438*** 
(0.0204) 
0.330*** 
(0.0215) 
0.328*** 
(0.0220) 
0.250*** 
(0.0234) 
Relegation (t-1) 
-0.365*** 
(0.0334) 
-0.309*** 
(0.0302) 
-0.329*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.213*** 
(0.0306) 
Second tier 
-0.153*** 
(0.0224) 
-0.0147 
(0.0215) 
-0.0681*** 
(0.0215) 
-0.190*** 
(0.0266) 
Third tier 
-0.350*** 
(0.0441) 
-0.176*** 
(0.0392) 
-0.0627 
(0.0557) 
-0.307*** 
(0.0666) 
P (t-1)  
0.0890*** 
(0.00748) 
0.0445*** 
(0.00805) 
0.0474*** 
(0.0104) 
∆ P (t)  
0.175*** 
(0.00778) 
0.107*** 
(0.00802) 
0.101*** 
(0.00845) 
P (t-1) * T2   
0.0596*** 
(0.0118) 
0.0635*** 
(0.0148) 
∆ P (t) * T2   
0.100*** 
(0.0140) 
0.0993*** 
(0.0142) 
P (t-1) * T3   
0.148*** 
(0.0261) 
0.188*** 
(0.0313) 
∆ P (t) * T3   
0.144*** 
(0.0246) 
0.167*** 
(0.0272) 
Constant 
-0.611*** 
(0.0781) 
-0.922*** 
(0.0782) 
-0.855*** 
(0.0757) 
-2.228*** 
(0.494) 
Observations 2360 2360 2360 2360 
R-squared 0.407 0.541 0.557 0.618 
Number of clubs    176 
*, ** and *** mean respectively significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 6 Probit regressions explaining insolvencies 
 t t:t-1 t:t-2 t:t-3 t:t-4 t:t-5 
Professional 
* Association 
1.195*** 
(0.259) 
1.612*** 
(0.289) 
1.582*** 
(0.320) 
1.443*** 
(0.325) 
1.421*** 
(0.375) 
1.348*** 
(0.377) 
Professional 
* Company 
0.470** 
(0.240) 
0.791*** 
(0.268) 
0.806*** 
(0.298) 
0.701** 
(0.305) 
0.779** 
(0.359) 
0.645* 
(0.359) 
DNCG 
0.294* 
(0.173) 
0.285 
(0.182) 
0.191 
(0.189) 
0.159 
(0.195) 
0.091 
(0.208) 
0.085 
(0.210) 
Amateur 
control 
0.412 
(0.334) 
0.273 
(0.386) 
-0.070 
(0.406) 
-0.296 
(0.433) 
-0.531 
(0.459) 
-0.378 
(0.485) 
Second tier 
0.688*** 
(0.153) 
0.633*** 
(0.158) 
0.637*** 
(0.159) 
0.625*** 
(0.160) 
0.575*** 
(0.161) 
0.575*** 
(0.166) 
Third tier 
1.300*** 
(0.343) 
1.506*** 
(0.362) 
1.733*** 
(0.375) 
1.911*** 
(0.398) 
2.025*** 
(0.409) 
1.904*** 
(0.442) 
Residual t 
-0.636*** 
(0.224) 
     
Residual t:t-1  
-0.566*** 
(0.174) 
    
Residual t:t-2   
-0.373** 
(0.159) 
   
Residual t:t-3    
-0.266* 
(0.141) 
  
Residual t:t-4     
-0.152 
(0.128) 
 
Residual t:t-5      
-0.078 
(0.119) 
Constant 
-3.475*** 
(0.290) 
-3.848*** 
(0.324) 
-3.758*** 
(0.347) 
-3.592*** 
(0.350) 
-3.543*** 
(0.392) 
-3.436*** 
(0.397) 
Observations 2360 2127 1940 1784 1648 1537 
Insolvencies 69 58 55 52 46 43 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo-R² 0.124 0.150 0.144 0.140 0.132 0.128 
*, ** and *** mean respectively significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 The frequency of insolvencies per season in French soccer clubs, 1970-2014 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Average team position (normalized) from season t-12 to season t+12, where season t 
refers to any season in which insolvency occurred over the period 1970-1993 
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Figure 3 Average team attendance from season t-12 to season t+12, where season t refers to any 
season in which insolvency occurred over the period 1970-1993 
 
 
Figure 4 Average team position (normalized) from season t-12 to season t+12, where season t 
refers to any season in which insolvency occurred over the period 1993-2014 
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Figure 5 Average team attendance from season t-12 to season t+12, where season t refers to any 
season in which insolvency occurred over the period 1993-2014 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 Position “normalization” 
Actual 
ranking 
22 
teams 
21 
teams 
19 
teams 
18 
teams 
17 
teams 
16 
teams 
15 
teams 
14 
teams 
13 
teams 
12 
teams 
11 
teams 
10 
teams 
9 teams 8 teams 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 7 8 8 10 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 8 9 10 10.5 11 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 9 10 10.5 11 13 14 
7 7 7 7 7 7 8 9 10 10.5 11 12 13 15 17 
8 8 8 8 8 9 10 10.5 11 12 13 14 16 18 20 
9 9 9 9 10 10.5 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 20 
 
10 9.5 10 10.5 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 
  
11 10 10.5 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
   
12 11 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
    
13 11.5 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
     
14 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 
      
15 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 
       
16 14 15 17 18 19 20 
        
17 15 16 18 19 20 
         
18 16 17 19 20 
          
19 17 18 20 
           
20 18 19 
            
21 19 20 
            
22 20 
             
 
